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nonsense. Aside from almost unparalleled recklessness of statement of this kind, there are instances of amusing carelessness. On p. 63 there is introduced an antiquated drawing of a nebula found in *Canes Venatici*, under which is the title "Known as Cane's Venatice, which is a solar comet in gestation;" and farther on, "Cane's Venatice" is solemnly discussed in the text as a *comet*.

The book is not worth thus much of notice, and there would be no occasion for giving it any attention at all were it not put forth in pious garb as a verification of the Bible. It is needless to observe that the Bible and the cause of religion have no worse enemies than works of this sort.

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THE WORLD AND THE INDIVIDUAL. Gifford Lectures, delivered at the University of Aberdeen. By JOSIAH ROYCE. Second Series: *Nature, Man, and the Moral Order*. New York: Macmillan, 1901. Pp. xvi + 452. \$2.25.

IN his first series of *Gifford* lectures¹ Professor Royce undertakes to lay the metaphysical foundations of his system of philosophy; in the series before us the principles earlier discovered are used to elucidate a number of our deeper ethical and theological problems.

In its dominant note the system may be described as a *profound* anthropomorphism. Not the outward trappings nor the transient phases of man, but his essential and permanent characteristics, are searched out by many devices of ingenious and scholarly scrutiny, and then this sublimated essence is generalized and asserted to be the very heart and core of universal reality. Man is a Self, a being with a unique purpose; and only selves are real. But man is also in essence a person, a moral self that consciously strives to find its ideal and realize it, and that includes within its being other lesser selves, some of them non-moral. And God also is a person, the person of persons, whose essence it also is to strive and to include other selves, indeed *all* selves, among them men, the selves of larger scope that include men, and countless others; *e.g.*, as Professor Royce tentatively suggests, the selves hinted to us in animal species and by inorganic nature. But this does not exhaust the essence of God. In addition to striving he attains his ideals, among them the ideal of knowledge. In addition to self-consciously experiencing and understanding the whole of the

¹ See this JOURNAL, Vol. V, No. 2 (April, 1901), pp. 328-30.

strivings of all his included selves, which are also his strivings, he also experiences and appreciates their and his attainment—he views the universe, and he views it *totum simul*, in one eternal moment.

And, coming to more practical problems, the freedom of man and of other finite selves is genuine as far as it goes, though by no means unlimited. The kind, the universal aspect of the purpose of each self, is wholly determined by others from without, but what unique and individual embodiment this purpose shall have is determined from within by the free choice of the self concerned. Thus every finite self is largely, but not wholly, determined; while God, the All-inclusive, having none without him, is wholly free.

Again, the life of man and of other “ethical individuals” is immortal or unending. For, that every purpose finds fulfilment is fundamental for Professor Royce, and a moral purpose ever demands new embodiments, as each oncoming situation presents new duties to keep alive the purpose of a moral self *in infinitum*. Of course, this doctrine compels the author to deny that death is the end of man. But how he substantiates this position it is impossible so much as to hint, in default of space to suggest his theory of nature, as a system of non-material selves of broader scope, inclusive of man among other selves. Both theories are very interesting and original, and, together with the reconciliation of evil with the divine perfection, call forth some fascinating discussions.

This must serve to suggest, most inadequately, the mere framework of Professor Royce's system. The consideration that it takes into account only human reason and its implications affords the justification for calling it anthropomorphic. And the further consideration that for the author our reason is but a special form of purposeful activity, which he would admit to be a product of evolution, destined, in all probability, to be superseded by some higher type of activity, with its higher form of reflection—this consideration proposes a question to Professor Royce, which he and others have proposed to Kant. How, namely, does he know that our present type of reason is to remain unmodified; how does he know that it will not give place to, say, an angelic reason, whose implications will picture a very different universe? But whether the author's conception be logically compulsory or merely a hypothesis, the marvelous consistency of its rich content, its frank and sympathetic attitude toward opposed views and awkward facts, an empirical basis unusually solid for a metaphysical theory, together with its excellent literary form, unite in

assuring it a broad and deep influence on philosophic and theological thought.

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THE INDIVIDUAL. A Study of Life and Death. By NATHANIEL SOUTHGATE SHALER. New York: Appleton, 1901. Pp. xi + 351. \$1.50.

PROFESSOR SHALER discusses the nature of the individual and of the relations of individuals to each other as viewed from the standpoint of natural science. His book includes in the first place the discussion of a problem—the problem of death. The problem of death is the problem of individuality, for it is the fact of death which makes the race-history a succession of individual lives rather than a continuous stream of existence. What, then, is the meaning and function of death in the process of human evolution? The answer is as follows: Death removes the useless and defective individuals whose multiplication and continued existence would interfere with the further progress of the race. In imposing a predetermined limit upon individual life nature herself removes a difficulty which could not be so easily removed in any other way. The discussion of the problem as such covers, however, only a small part of the book, most of it being taken up with a description of the individual in his various aspects and relations. The author begins with a description of inorganic individuals, *i. e.*, crystals, molecules, and atoms, all of which, he thinks, may be complex in their nature. His treatment of organic individuals (which naturally takes up most of the book) covers such questions as the duration of the individual life, the place of organic life in the universe, the relation of individuals to each other, the relation of parent and child, and the value of old age. His general point of view is that of the organic unity of the race. Though the characteristics observable in individuals vary widely, yet each individual has inherited practically the whole nature of the race; he also transmits his inherited capacities to practically all of the coming race. Accordingly, the individual is not a mere atom of humanity, but the representative of all that is contained in human nature; and the development of the race as a whole is nothing but a more complete development of the qualities contained in each individual. The discussion closes with a chapter on “Immortality,” in which the author holds that science has no positive ground for the denial of immortality, while, on the other hand, the great significance